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FIRREA DISRUPTS TRADITIONAL NOTIONS OF
ATTORNEY DUTY BY EXPOSING LAWYERS, AS
FINANCIAL INSTITITUION-AFFILIATED PARTIES,
TO PERSONAL LIABILITY*
I. INTRODUCTION
According to former Secretary of the Treasury Nicholas F.
Brady, more than 1000 savings and loans (hereinafter S&Ls), nearly
forty percent of the industry, are unsound or insolvent and ulti-
mately may be taken over by the federal government.' This alarming
statistic naturally raises the question of who shall pay for the bail-
out, which could cost over $500 billion.2 The most obvious answer is
the federal government, since it has possibly the deepest of all pock-
ets in this country.' But because the federal government, specifically
Congress, decided who shall be economically responsible for failed
financial institutions, Congress obviously did not choose itself to bear
the entire financial burden of the bail-out."
This search for alternative deep pockets is also motivated by
Congress' fear of potential public anger. The federal government, as
insurer of depository institutions, promises depositors that their
money will be safe. However, the government does not possess the
resources to fund the bail-out entirely on its own5 and therefore
eventually must renege on its promise to depositors. To pay for the
bail-out, then, the government must increase taxes to bolster the fed-
eral insurance fund. This tax hike essentially means that depositors
will be insuring themselves, because their own tax money will be
* c 1993 Joseph E. Addiego III
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1. Lucia J. Mandarino, Note, Too Many Consonants and Not Enough Consonance:
The Development of the S&L Regulatory Framework, 59 FORDHAM L. REVIEW 263, 263
(1991).
2. Id. The Lincoln Savings and Loan scandal alone could cost more than $2.6 billion.
Nancy Rutter, Dirty Hands, CAL. LAW., Jan. 1992, at 30.
3. Keith R. Fisher, Regulators Find New Deep Pockets in Bank Counsel, BANKING L.
REV., Summer 1991, at 3, 12.
4. Id. at 3.
5. Id. at 12.
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used to refund their own lost deposits. As a professor of law at Duke
University stated, "[T]he unprecedented exposure of taxpayers to the
risk of depository institution failure is forcing the banking agencies
to adopt a vigorous, formalistic, and unduly punitive approach to
banking supervision."'
The federal government also may be taking this approach be-
cause of Congressional complicity in creating the need for and the
size of the bail-out.7 Congress assisted the Administration in creating
a set of regulatory and accounting rules that allowed troubled finan-
cial institutions to postpone failure long enough to massively increase
the size of the ultimate loss.8 Because of this Congressional complic-
ity, the government is very eager to share the blame and appear to be
aggressive on the taxpayers' behalf by extending liability for the
problem to other groups.9 Lawyers, because they have malpractice
insurance coverage, are very convenient scapegoats,' even though
they will provide only a small percentage of the total cost of the bail-
out. i1
Due to the aforementioned factors, Congress passed the Finan-
cial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (hereinaf-
ter FIRREA).'2 According to FIRREA, attorneys who act as corpo-
rate counsel to financial institutions 3 are considered "institution-
6. Lawrence G. Baxter, judicial Responses to the Recent Enforcement Activities of the
Federal Banking Regulators, 59 FORDHAM L. REVIEW 193, 194 (1991).
7. For example, Charles Keating's influence with Congress enabled him to fend off
inspection by the federal regulators temporarily, thus allowing his illegal financial practices to
continue. This procured delay increased the ultimate amount of loss to the depositors and
shareholders. Rutter, supra note 2, at 32, 35.
8. Investigation of Lincoln Savings and Loan Association: Hearing Before the House
Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 284 (1989) [hereinaf-
ter Hearing] (prepared statement of William K. Black, District Counsel for the San Francisco
District, Office of Thrift Supervision). See infra notes 190-205 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Acquisition, Development, and Construction Loans.
9. Fisher, supra note 3, at 3.
10. Id.
11. The Lincoln Savings and Loan scandal demonstrates the validity of this assertion.
The total cost of the bail-out for the failure of Lincoln Savings and Loan (hereinafter Lincoln)
is $2.6 billion. Rutter, supra note 2, at 30. The law firm of Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue
(hereinafter Jones Day), which served as legal counsel to Lincoln, was being sued for $80
million. Id. at 31. The firm settled the case for $41 million. Stephanie B. Goldberg, Kaye
Scholer: The Tremors Continue Part 1: Welcome to the New Uncertainty, 78 A.B.A. J. 50, 50
(1992). Thus, the suit provided provided only 1.58% of the total cost of the Lincoln bail-out.
12. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No.
101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) [hereinafter
FIRREA].
13. The term financial institution will be used in this comment to refer to banks, savings
associations, depository institutions, member banks, nonmember banks, and savings banks as
defined in 12 U.S.C.S. § 1813(a)-(g) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992), respectively. For purposes of
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affiliated part[ies]""' and now are exposed to personal liability
should the financial institutions fail for reasons specified in the Act.' 5
As a result, FIRREA "raises all sorts of questions about what duties
are owed by counsel providing legal services to an institution and to
whom such duties are owed."' 6
Harris Weinstein, former Chief Counsel, Office of Thrift Su-
pervision, Department of the Treasury, has suggested a somewhat
radical answer to this question, as, according to one commentator,
his views "are 'quite a departure' from what most private counsel
understand their duties to the government to be.' 7 Weinstein's
model for liability does not rely on FIRREA and can exist indepen-
dently, 8 and vice versa. However, his proposal certainly comple-
ments the statute and draws strength from it to support his model.
Weinstein states that the federal government is the ultimate insurer
of a failed financial institution, and he asserts that:
[E]very fiduciary of a federally insured depository institution
[i.e. counsel to the institution, as well as the directors of the
institution] owes the federal insurer, at the very minimum, the
very same high fiduciary duties that are owed depositors . . .
[including] the duty not to risk ... loss of funds deposited with
the institution ... [and] a strict fiduciary duty to act in the best
interest of the institution, its shareholders and its depositors."
Weinstein's position is that, under certain circumstances, the duty of
the attorney to the federal government as insurer, to the degree that
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (hereinafter FDIC), as
insurer, stands in the shoes of the depositors, is greater than the duty
owed to the client institution.2"
Attorneys are being blamed, at least in part, for the banking
and savings and loan crisis. The impact of this public opinion is
this comment, these terms are used interchangeably.
14. 12 U.S.C.S. § 1813(u) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
15. These reasons are discussed in detail later in this comment. See infra notes 67, 79,
83-84, & 104 and accompanying text.
16. Fisher, supra note 3, at 3.
17. ABA Task Force Studies Bank Counsel Liability, BANK/THRIFT LITIG. & EN-
FORCEMENT NEWS, Oct. 29, 1990, at 1, 6 (quoting Keith Fisher).
18. "[W]e already have a code of ethics [for fiduciaries of depository institutions] and the
existing rules are more than adequate to the task." Harris Weinstein, Remarks delivered at
Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Tex. 1 (Sept. 13, 1990) (transcript available in South-
ern Methodist University Law School Library), in Speech by OTS Chief Counsel Weinstein on
Duties of Depository Institution Fiduciaries, 55 BNA's BANKING REP. 510 (1990) [hereinaf-
ter Weinstein].
19. Id. at 4.
20. ABA Task Force Studies Bank Counsel Liability, supra note 17, at 1.
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reflected in FIRREA's inclusion of attorneys as parties who are po-
tentially personally liable for thrift failure. The FDIC has gone one
step further by filing approximately 140 lawsuits against individual
attorneys and their firms "whose competence in representing finan-
cial institutions is beyond question."'" Some of these attorneys even
served as counsel to the FDIC in prior actions." Therefore, in order
to protect themselves against personal liability, counsel to financial
institutions must devise a scheme to follow when advising these de-
positories.2" This comment attempts to clarify attorneys' duties under
FIRREA and to construct a model of representation that has these
goals in mind. Further, this comment suggests to the American Bar
Association Task Force on the Liability of Counsel Representing
Depository Institutions (hereinafter Task Force)24 various theories to
investigate.
First, this comment examines prior treatment by the federal
regulators of attorneys' fiduciary duties to their clients and the fed-
eral government." Then the need for FIRREA, the text of FIR-
REA, and its legislative history are discussed in order to trace the
origins of this new standard of liability.26 Specific attention is given
to the term "unsafe and unsound,"2 a concept that pre-dates FIR-
REA.2" This term is not expressly defined in the text of FIRREA,
and its meaning is critical to the determination of lawyer duty and
liability. If the actions contemplated by the institution are definitely
illegal or blatantly illegal, the attorney's duties are fairly clear under
FIRREA and the Codes of Professional Responsibility. However,
21. Dennis J. Lehr, Balancing the Fourth Branch: Dealing with FDICIRTC Focus on
Attorney Conduct, 57 BNA's BANKING REP. 59, 59 (1991).
22. Id.
23. The terms financial institutions, banks, thrifts, and depositories will be used inter-
changeably in this comment.
24. The Task Force, headed by Keith Fisher, was formed by the ABA for the following
reasons:
[To] study the current trend toward increased liability of depository institu-
tion[s] counsel, evaluate the theories on which such liability is predicated, and
report on the extent to which those theories are consistent, with or depart from,
accepted standards of professional conduct .... It is hoped that the Task Force's
final report will serve as a springboard for informed discussion and debate on
the proper role of the legal profession in effecting these important [public policy]
goals [of protecting the attorney client privilege and] ... promoting public confi-
dence in our nation's financial intermediaries.
Fisher, supra note 3, at 12.
25. See infra part II.A.
26. See infra part lI.B.
27. 12 U.S.C.S. § 1813(u)(4)(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
28. See infra part II.C.
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the acts of the institution in which attorneys are involved may not
clearly be illegal, i.e., "unsafe and unsound." If the act is not obvi-
ously illegal but is unsafe and unsound, it is deemed technically ille-
gal according to FIRREA.29 The problem for attorneys, then, lies in
how they are supposed to know whether the act is unsafe and un-
sound and what they should do if it is.
Next, this comment discusses at length Harris Weinstein's posi-
tion regarding the fiduciary duties attorneys owe to their client insti-
tutions and to the federal government as insurer."0 Support and criti-
cism of the theory are also examined. 31 Special attention is paid to
Weinstein's insurance argument and his discussion regarding attor-
ney duty to the institution. 2 Weinstein's proposal is then used as the
model standard of duty in a discussion of fact scenarios, and this
discussion illustrates what lawyers' duties are and to whom these
duties are owed.3 During this examination, Weinstein's position is
tested and critiqued to determine how far it can be extended34 and if
it could or should be modified to make it more practical and fair to
attorneys. Once the standards of attorney duty are established, this
comment suggests how lawyers should structure their representation
so as to insulate themselves from personal liability when serving as
counsel for depositories. 5 This comment also suggests that if lawyers
take the precautionary measures proposed by the author, FIRREA
does not necessarily have to produce a chilling effect on attorney rep-
resentation of financial depositories. 6 The author proposes alterna-
tive ways for attorneys to protect themselves from personal liability
other than refusing to represent financial depositories altogether. 7
II. BACKGROUND
A. Pre-FIRREA/ Common Law Fiduciary Duties of Attorneys
The passage of FIRREA changed, or at least modified, the ex-
isting law regarding attorneys' fiduciary duties. Prior to the 1980s,
29. 12 U.S.C.S. § 1813(u) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
30. See infra part IID.
31. See infra parts IV.A.1-2.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 109-14.
33. See infra part IV.B.
34. "[Tjhe question arises whether national interest in the safety and soundness of our
financial institutions should, as a matter of policy, outweigh the societal interests served by the
strict duties of loyalty and confidentiality that obtain in the relationship of attorney and cli-
ent." Fisher, supra note 3, at 12.
35. See infra part V.A.
36. See infra part V.B.
37. See infra part V.
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there were very few enforcement actions, because there were very
few bank failures.38 In the mid-1980s, the number of bank failures
increased dramatically, 9 and consequently greater attention was
paid to enforcement.40 These efforts, however, started with estab-
lished law and the most clearly fraudulent cases, usually involving
insiders.41
While the argument that attorneys owe the highest fiduciary
duty to the federal government existed before FIRREA was en-
acted,4 this theory was not often used in enforcement actions by the
federal regulators.' A 1990 Hastings Law Journal Note concluded
that "[t]he scarcity of issued regulations or reported judicial deci-
sions, however, suggests that the regulatory agencies chose to leave
this potential enforcement power. [of filing suit against attorneys for
breach of fiduciary duty] largely unexercised."" The federal regula-
tors followed this course of action, at least in part, because "the lan-
guage of [regulatory statutes prior to FIRREA] was aimed primarily
at the activities of financial institution directors, officers, and other
insiders, and not at outside parties such as attorneys."' 5
Prior to FIRREA, even if the federal enforcement agencies had
been more aggressive, it was difficult for any individual related to a
financial institution, be it as officer, director, or attorney, to be
pinned with personal liability.46 This fact is true, in part, because
the Seventh Circuit ruled that, notwithstanding broad statutory lan-
guage, individuals could be held liable only when they had personal
38. For example, between 1943 and 1974, only five out of every 14,000 banks failed.
EDWARD L. SYMONS, JR. & JAMES J. WHITE, BANKING LAW 547 (3d ed. 1991).
39. Id. at 547-48. "In addition, the number of banks designated as problem banks by
the FDIC exceeded 1,000 for the last several years of the 19 80s." Id. at 547.
40. Id. at 548.
41. See Larimore v. Comptroller of the Currency, 789 F.2d 1244 (7th Cir. 1986); del
Junco v. Conover, 682 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1982).
42. Weinstein, supra note 18, at 2-3.
43. Raymund G. Kawasaki, Note, Liability of Attorneys, Accountants, Appraisers and
Other Independent Contractors Under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and En-
forcement Act of 1989, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 249, 252 (1990).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 254 (emphasis added).
46. The officers and directors of financial institutions did have common-law duties, how-
ever, and they "are, in effect, held to a higher standard of care than directors of other types of
corporations." Danny Clearman, Comment, FDIC and FSLIC Pursuit of Claims Against
Officers, Directors, and Others Involved with Failed Lenders, 58 Miss. L.J. 89, 102-03
(1988) (footnotes omitted). Corporate directors and officers have three primary duties: first,
they are to act only within the power given to them by the corporation; second, the degree of
care they are to display should be that of an ordinary prudent person; and third, they are not
to use the corporation for their own personal gain. Id.
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knowledge of the wrongdoing."' In Larimore v. Comptroller of the
Currency,"' the Comptroller of the Currency (hereinafter Comptrol-
ler) assessed personal liability against and sought compensation from
individual directors of the First National Bank of Mt. Auburn, Illi-
nois for losses resulting from their approval of loans that exceeded
the legal lending limit as outlined in 12 U.S.C. § 84."' One issue in
Larimore was whether 12 U.S.C. § 93,50 which "imposes liability
on directors [of financial institutions] for knowingly violating or
knowingly permitting violations of banking laws,"51 controlled con-
struction and application of 12 U.S.C. § 181852 on the same facts.53
Under 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1), 54 the Comptroller is provided with
the power to issue cease-and-desist orders on persons participating in
the affairs of a bank if they "[engage] in statutory violations or un-
safe banking practices."55 On this issue, the Larimore court reviewed
the decision of del Junco v. Conover,56 in which the court expressly
stated that it did not decide whether 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b) "im-
port[ed] the scienter requirement of 12 U.S.C. § 93.''57 The Lari-
more court ruled that § 93. does control § 1818(b), and therefore
§ 1818(b) included a "knowing or reckless" requirement.58 Under
Larimore, then, for officers and directors to be personally liable, they
must knowingly or recklessly commit the illegal acts.
The Larimore court added another requirement for officers .and
directors to be held personally liable for knowing or reckless illegal
acts. The court stated, "To date, no' court has analyzed, much less
set forth, any rationale that would support [the Comptroller] impos-
ing personal liability upon directors." '59 Directors are first entitled to
a trial in a proper court, and will not be held "personally liable
[unless they have received] all the constitutional and legal protections
accorded every citizen in a trial in a United States District Court."60
The salient question with regards to attorney duty is whether
47. Larimore v. Comptroller of the Currency, 789 F.2d 1244, 1255 (7th Cir. 1986).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1245, 1247; 12 U.S.C. § 84 (1988).
50. 12 U.S.C. § 93 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
51. del Junco v. Conover, 682 F.2d 1338, 1341-42 (9th Cir. 1982).
52. 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
53. Larimore v. Comptroller of the Currency, 789 F.2d 1244, 1255 (7th Cir. 1986).
54. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
55. Id. at 1251.
56. del Junco v. Conover, 682 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1982).
57. Id. at 1342.
58. Larimore, 789 F.2d at 1255.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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the regulations at issue in Larimore and del Junco could be extrapo-
lated to lawyers at all. A key point here is that § 93 and § 1818
never expressly applied to lawyers. Assuming that the regulations
could be applied, the result is that regulators could seek indemnity
from non-directors, i.e., attorneys acting as counsel to institutions,
only if the regulators were acting in place of the lender via receiver-
ship or assignment.61 The federal regulators, acting as insurers or
subrogees, could not assess personal liability on attorneys under this
model.6
2
The Larimore-del Junco model suggests that the FDIC and
FSLIC, as insurers or receivers, could not seek personal liability
under § 93 or § 1818 but leaves open the possibility of liability
under common-law fiduciary obligations. Therefore, there were two
independent grounds for personal liability prior to FIRREA. First,
regulatory actions did apply to attorneys, though not expressly,
under § 1818(b). Second, breach of fiduciary duties exposed attor-
neys to regulatory action on a common-law basis. FIRREA com-
bined these two grounds, making lawyers liable on a regulatory basis
for common-law breaches of fiduciary duty. Under FIRREA, law-
yers are subject to the "knowing and reckless" standard, but officers
and directors are not.
The passage of FIRREA modifies this prior existing law. FIR-
REA gives federal regulators the ability to act against attorneys on a
regulatory basis and not just on a reactive basis as insurers or receiv-
ers. FIRREA also eliminates the "knowing or reckless" standard to
impose personal liability on officers and directors. Federal regulators
now have preventive authority to step in and stem financial failure
before it is too late. 63
B. Body and History of FIRREA
According to one commentator, "FIRREA was enacted to rec-
tify existing problems in the thrift industry and to establish 'a new
era for insured institutions and their regulators.' "64 Four of the
61. Clearman, supra note 46, at 115. "In some instances, the regulators are actually
appointed receivers of the institutions." Id. at 91.
62. Regulators, as insurers, are entitled to "step into the shoes of the institution as sub-
rogee and may pursue any claim the institution might have pursued." Id. at 92.
63. Michael R. Malloy, Nothing to Fear but FIRREA Itself. Revising and Reshaping
the Enforcement Process of Federal Bank Regulation, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 1117, 1148 (1989).
64. Anthony C. Providenti, Jr., Note, Playing with FIRREA and Not Getting Burned:
Statutory Overview of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of
1919, 59 FORDHAM L. REVIEW 323, 323 (1991).
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many purposes of FIRREA explicitly address this concern:
(5) To put the Federal deposit insurance funds on a sound fi-
nancial footing.
(8) To provide funds from public and private sources to deal
expeditiously with failed depository institutions.
(9) To strengthen the enforcement powers of Federal regulators
of depository institutions.
(10) To strengthen the civil sanctions and criminal penalties for
defrauding or otherwise damaging depository institutions and
their depositors.65
The regulators and the Attorney General felt that they needed
stronger enforcement powers to better prevent the increasing prob-
lem of bank and thrift failure.6" For example, the former monetary
penalties were inadequate as punishment and deterrent, because they
were insubstantial compared to the large sums of money being trans-
acted by financial institutions.
67
As a result of this perceived need, Congress broadened the scope
65. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No.
101-73, 103 Stat. 183, 187 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) (emphasis
added). The other purposes of FIRREA include:
(1) To promote, through regulatory reform, a safe and stable system of afforda-
ble housing finance.
(2) To improve the supervision of savings associations by strengthening capital,
accounting, and other supervisory standards.
(3) To curtail investments and other activities of savings associations that pose
unacceptable risks to the Federal Deposit Insurance funds.
(4) To promote the independence of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
from the institutions the deposits of which it insures, by providing an indepen-
dent board of directors, adequate funding, and appropriate powers.
(6) To establish an Office of Thrift Supervision in the Department of the Trea-
sury, under the general oversight of the Secretary of the Treasury.
(7) To establish a new corporation, to be known as the Resolution Trust Corpo-
ration, to contain, manage, and resolve failed savings associations.
Id. at 187.
66. Baxter, supra note 6, at 205.
67. Kawasaki, supra note 43, at 257. One excellent example of the need for increased
enforcement provisions is the Ponzi scheme. A savings and loan institution makes a loan, for
which it gets a fee. These fees are declared as profits by the S&L. When the S&L makes a big
loan, the S&L pays itself the fee, which it then declares as a profit. In reality, however, there
are not any profits until the loan has begun to be repaid, which never happens. Thus, the
S&Ls have misleading balance sheets, which show that they are making money when they
actually are losing it. This practice of "Ponzi finance," or taking out a new set of liabilities to
pay the interest on the old liabilities, has contributed greatly to the S&L problems in recent
years. MARTIN MAYER, THE GREATEST-EVER BANK ROBBERY 7, 20 (1990); see also Hear-
ing, supra note 8, at 304.
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of who may be liable for a financial institution's failure by passing
12 U.S.C. § 1813(u). 8 This section has caused a great deal of con-
cern for attorneys who act as counsel for financial institutions. It
provides:
(u) Institution-affiliated party. The term "institution-affiliated
party" means-
... (4) any independent contractor (including any attorney, ap-
praiser, or accountant) who knowingly or recklessly participates
in-
(A) any violation of the law or regulation;
(B) any breach of fiduciary duty; or
(C) any unsafe or unsound practice,
which caused or is likely to cause more than a minimal financial
loss to, or a significant adverse effect on, the insured depository
institution. 9
By including attorneys as institution-affiliated parties, FIRREA ex-
poses attorneys to personal liability when a depository fails. "[T]he
concept of 'institution-affiliated party' [also] gives the regulators pre-
ventive authority before matters have reached the dire straits of the
actual failure of the institution. ' 70 With this power, the regulators
may initiate cease-and-desist proceedings against the institution-affil-
iated parties,"' issue and enforce temporary cease-and-desist orders
against them," exercise their removal and prohibition authority
against the parties,7" suspend or remove institution-affiliated parties
charged with a felony,74 or enforce a civil money penalty (hereinafter
68. 12 U.S.C.S. § 1813(u) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
69. Id. The "knowing or reckless" standard was eliminated from the list of require-
ments with respect to personal liability for officers and directors, which overruled the standard
in Larimore v. Comptroller of the Currency, 789 F.2d 1244 (7th Cir. 1986), and del Junco v.
Conover, 682 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1982).
70. Malloy, supra note 63, at 1148.
71. If the institution-affiliated party has engaged or is about to engage in unsafe and
unsound practices as part of the business of the financial institution, or if the agency has
reasonable cause to believe the institution or party is about to break the law, the agency may
issue a cease-and-desist order to prevent such action to the party or institution. 12 U.S.C.S.
§ 1818(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992). "A cease-and-desist order is the administrative
equivalent of an injunction." Malloy, supra note 63, at 1120.
72. 12 U.S.C.S. § 1818(c)-(d) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
73. Whenever the banking agency decides the institution-affiliated party breaks or vio-
lates any provisions of this section, the agency may exercise its removal and prohibition au-
thority "to remove such party from office or to prohibit any further participation by such
party, in any manner, in the conduct of the affairs of any insured depository institution." 12
U.S.C.S. § 1818(e) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
74. 12 U.S.C.S. § 1818(g) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
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CMP) against them. 5 The CMPs are of the greatest concern to at-
torneys, because such penalties could bankrupt them personally, as
well as their firms.7 Therefore, attorneys must confine their conduct
to a standard of practice that minimizes, if not eliminates, their ex-
posure to CMPs.
There were several reasons for the passage of FIRREA. It was
enacted primarily because federally insured financial institutions
were failing in such large numbers that the FDIC and FSLIC could
not cover all of the monetary loss." As the legislative history of FIR-
REA indicates, "[tlhe thrift industry and FSLIC are now in perilous
financial condition ... unhealthy thrifts have bankrupted the FSLIC
and jeopardized the future of the industry." 78
A major contributor to this problem is "outright fraud and in-
sider abuse [by institution management and counsel]. ' ' 9 Examina-
tion of the legislative purposes of FIRREA80 clearly reveals that
Congress targeted private counsel as one of the sources for replenish-
ing the federal insurance funds.
Public confidence in financial institutions has waned as a result
of the increasing frequency of their failure."1 By holding attorneys
personally liable, Congress also hopes FIRREA will restore con-
sumer confidence, because the Act provides regulators with the
power to punish any culpable institution-affiliated party, which in
turn deters future illegal and punishable conduct.8 2
Congress chose to specify attorneys as targets for personal lia-
75. There are three tiers of civil money penalties. The amount of the fine depends on
the nature of the crime. 12 U.S.C.S. § 1818(i) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992). For a description of
the three tiers and their application, see Fisher, supra note 3, at 7-9.
76. The distinction between CMPs and damages for breach of fiduciary duty is signifi-
cant. If the federal regulator determines that the attorney has committed a violation of any
statute, it may assess CMPs on a daily basis and in varying degrees, depending on the severity
of the violation. Penalties are assessed for each individual violation and continue to be levied
until the violation is discontinued. 12 U.S.C.S. § 1818(i)(2)(A)-(D) (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1992). See also Fisher, supra note 3, at 7-8. Because certain actions taken by attorneys and
the institutions they represent may involve several individual violations, and because the penal-
ties are ongoing until corrected, the total amount attorneys may be forced to pay can become
substantial. These penalties are much more worrisome to attorneys than are compensatory
damages resulting from breaches of fiduciary duty, because such damages are limited to the
amount of money that was lost. CMPs, on the other hand, are potentially limitless.
77. H.R. REP. No. 101-54(I), 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 290 (1989), reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 100. FIRREA has replaced the FSLIC with the Savings Association Insur-
ance Fund [hereinafter SAIF]. Providenti, supra note 64, at 336.
78. H.R. REP. No. 101-54(l), supra note 77, at 90, 99.
79. Id. at 90.
80. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
81. H.R. REP. No 101-54(I), supra note 77, at 98.
82. Id. at 262.
19931
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
bility, because they have been involved in the insider abuse "[by]
participat[ing] in some of the serious misconduct in banks and thrift
institutions." 8 However, Congress provided for personal liability of
counsel to financial institutions only if the attorneys in some way
were involved in the conduct of the depository. 4 In addition, the
legislative history clearly indicates that attorneys are not to be held
liable if they act in good faith.8 5 "However, an attorney who does
provide legal advice and services and then knowingly participates in
other activities which result in serious misconduct would be subject
to enforcement actions." 6 Thus, if the law is unsettled as to a partic-
ular type of transaction or banking practice, lawyers may counsel
their financial institution clients on a course of action that possibly
could be a violation of the law. 87 Under FIRREA, however, the ad-
vice is considered to be given in good faith if there is a chance that
the institution could successfully challenge the law in an administra-
tive or judicial proceeding. 8
The problem with this kind of counselling, though, is that such
advice could be deemed "unsafe and unsound" according to the stan-
dard set forth in FIRREA. If the instruction to act given by the
attorney to the client is not clearly illegal, but only arguably so, it
may still be unsafe and unsound and thus be prohibited as illegal by
FIRREA. 9 Thus, for attorneys to counsel financial institutions,
while at the same time insulate themselves from personal liability, it
must be determined what constitutes unsafe and unsound practices.
C. Pre-FIRREA Definitions and Uses of "Unsafe and Unsound"
The definition of "unsafe and unsound" is essential in deter-
mining attorney liability, and an understanding of its application is
critical if lawyers are to avoid such personal liability.9" The meaning
83. d.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 263; see also infra notes 201-02 and accompanying text. Officers and direc-
tors, however, may be held liable without meeting the "knowing and reckless" standard.
86. H.R. REP. No. 101-54(I), supra note 77, at 263.
87. Id.
88. Id.; see also Fisher, supra note 3, at 6.
89. See FIRREA, supra note 12.
90. The term "knowingly or recklessly" is another term not expressly defined by FIR-
REA, and its understanding is also essential in determining how to apply the statute. Fisher
suggests that the term "might well be construed to embody concepts from tort law and criminal
law. If so, the phrase would presumably exclude only conduct that is 'merely' negligent."
Fisher, supra note 3, at 4. Raymund G. Kawasaki agrees with Fisher and has followed
Fisher's suggestion, proposing that the definition should be derived from tort and criminal law
concepts. Kawasaki, supra note 43, at 249. Kawasaki asserts that the "knowingly and reck-
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of the term is especially crucial with respect to the question of
whether it is unsafe and unsound for lawyers to provide their client
institutions with financial, as well as legal, advice. "[The term] is
nowhere defined in the federal banking statutes [as it applies to at-
torneys],""1 but federal and state courts have defined the "concept
within the context of supervisory actions."'9
2
A classic definition of "unsafe and unsound" is found in the
decision of First National Bank v. Department of the Treasury.93
The court declared that "these terms encompass what may be gener-
ally viewed as conduct deemed contrary to accepted standards of
banking operations which might result in abnormal risk or loss to a
banking institution or shareholder." 9' This authoritative definition of
lessly" standard protects attorneys from liability under FIRREA for conduct that is merely
negligent and that the minimum standard regulators should use is that of "gross negligence."
Id. at 273-74. Kawasaki borrows definitions from the criminal law context in support of his
position:
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circum-
stances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances
exist; and
(ii) if the element involves the nature of his conduct, he is aware that it is
practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result.
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when
he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material
element exists or will result from his conduct . . . [the disregard of the risk]
involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding per-
son would observe in the actor's situation.
Id. at 274 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Official Draft 1985) (criminal law
construction)).
Kawasaki also refers to tort law to clarify the meaning of reckless.
The usual meaning assigned to . . . "reckless" . . . is that the actor has inten-
tionally done an act of an unreasonable character in disregard of a known or
obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would
follow, and which thus is usually accompanied by a conscious indifference to the
consequences.
Id. (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 213 (5th ed. 1984) (footnotes omitted)).
Even though the definition of "knowingly and recklessly" is not yet settled, it will be
useful for the overall understanding of this comment to consider the above suggestions.
91. Fisher, supra note 3, at 7 n.15.
92. Michael P. Malloy, Balancing Public Confidence and Confidentiality: Adjudica-
tion of Practices and Procedures of the Federal Bank Regulatory Agencies, 61 TEMPLE L.
REV. 723, 769 (1988). Fisher, citing the same case as Malloy, also suggests that the term can
be defined from supervisory action. Fisher, supra note 3, at 7 n.15.
93. First Nat'l Bank v. Department of the Treasury, 568 F.2d 610 (8th Cir. 1978).
94. Id. at 611 n.2; accord First Nat'l Bank v. Comptroller of the Currency, 697 F.2d
674, 685 (5th Cir. 1983); Gulf Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 651
F.2d 259, 264 (5th Cir., 1981). See also Fisher, supra note 3, at 7 n.15, and Malloy, supra
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the term has since been adopted by both houses of Congress.95 In a
memorandum, John Horne, the chairman of the Bank Board in
1966, explained that:
An 'unsafe or unsound practice' embraces any action, or lack of
action, which is contrary to generally accepted standards of pru-
dent operation, the possible consequences of which, if continued,
would be abnormal risk or loss or damage to an institution, its
shareholders, or the agencies administering the insurance
funds. 6
The FDIC Chairman agrees with this view and further states
that the determination of what is unsafe and unsound depends on the
individual context.97 "A particular activity not necessarily unsafe or
unsound in every instance may be so when considered in light of all
relevant facts .. .[T]he term 'unsafe and unsound practices' has a
central meaning which can and must be applied to constantly chang-
ing factual circumstances.' '98
Because of this ad-hoc, case-by-case determination of the term
"unsafe and unsound," the "courts have been relatively flexible in
interpreting the scope of the 'unsafe and unsound' enforcement pro-
visions. '"" This trend has worked in favor of bank regulators' discre-
tion. 100 However, this flexibility is not without limits,'' as the court
suggested in Gulf Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Federal
Home Loan Bank Board.' 2 According to the Gulf court, "[tihe
breadth of the 'unsafe and unsound practice' formula is restricted by
its limitation to practices with a reasonably direct effect on an associ-
ation's financial soundness."' 03
A listing of several examples of "unsafe and unsound" practice
helps illustrate the meaning of the term and provides a better under-
standing of how it is applied. Consider the following:
note 49, at 1120, who both used this language in their discussions of unsafe and unsound.
95. Gulf Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 651 F.2d at 264; see 112 CONG. REc. 24984 (1966)
(remarks of Rep. Patman).
96. 112 CONG. REC. 24984 (1966) (quoting John Horne); see also Malloy, supra note
92, at 772.
97. Malloy, supra note 92, at 770-71 (quoting George LeMaistre, Chairman, FDIC,
Testimony before the Senate Committee on the Subject of Overdrafts and Correspondent
Banking Practices, CIS, S-241-25 (1977)).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 771.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 772.
102. Gulf Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 651 F.2d 259, 264
(5th Cir. 1981).
103. Id.; see also Malloy, supra note 92, at 772; Fisher, supra note 3, at 7 n.15.
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(i) a pattern of loans made with inadequate security;
(iv) excessive volume of overdue loans in relation to gross loans,
due to hazardous lending and lax collection practices;
(vi) accumulation of an inordinate amount of unsafe assets, in
relation to gross capital;
(vii) failure to implement adequate internal controls and audit-
ing procedures;
(xiii) violations of lending limits .... 104
These examples list financial practices at odds with prudent manage-
ment in the financial services industry. However, the question of lia-
bility for attorneys who advise financial institutions engaged in such
practices is left open.
Even though the courts have defined unsafe and unsound prac-
tices, they never have done so with the idea of attorney liability in
mind. Therefore, it is not clear whether this established application
should apply to attorneys acting as counsel for financial institutions.
This issue is discussed below in the analysis section1 5 to determine
how much of a risk an attorney can take when giving "cuttingedge"
advice in unsettled areas of the law without engaging in an unsafe
and unsound practice. Even more perplexing is the issue of whether
it is unsafe and unsound for attorneys to provide their depository
institution clients with financial advice and judgments. The latter
problem also is discussed below,1"' specifically regarding to whom
the attorney owes a fiduciary duty when giving such financial advice.
D. Harris Weinstein's Proposal - Duty Is To Federal Insurer
Weinstein attempts to answer the question of to whom attor-
neys owe fiduciary duties by calling for an expansion of these duties.
When this heightened standard is coupled with FIRREA, which ex-
panded the remedies for breach of that duty, the combined effect is
that attorneys are much more vulnerable to personal liability if this
fiduciary duty is violated.
Weinstein asserts that " '[s]afe and sound' policies must be in-
stituted and maintained first to protect the public at large from the
adverse consequences inherent in the failure of depository institu-
104. Malloy, supra note 92, at 773-74 (footnotes omitted).
105. See infra part IV.3:
106. See infra part IV.3.b.
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tions, and second to limit the risks that ultimately are borne by de-
positors and their insurer, the federal government."' 0' These adverse
consequences may be caused and/or avoided through action taken by
counsel to the institution. Therefore, it is the "obligation of the insti-
tution's fiduciaries [which includes attorneys acting as the institu-
tion's counsel] to take every reasonable step to avoid loss of deposited
funds."' 08
Weinstein goes on to make a drastic proposal which, if adopted
by the courts, would revolutionize the thrift industry and attorney
representation as counsel for financial institutions.109 He begins be-
nignly, stating, "[i]t is a straight forward [h]ornbook principle that
an insurer who covers a loss is subrogated to the rights of the in-
sured."" Weinstein continues, asserting that fiduciaries of financial
institutions, at the very least, owe the same duty to the federal in-
surer as they do to the depositors."' Therefore, the federal govern-
ment as insurer possesses the same rights as the insured depositors to
obtain restitution from fiduciaries who are responsible for losing the
depositors' money." 2 The drastic leap Weinstein suggests is that at-
torneys, as fiduciaries, owe a greater duty to depositors, and by ex-
tension to the federal government as insurer, than they do to their
client institutions and the banks' directors." 8 "[T]he federal govern-
107. Weinstein, supra note 18, at 4 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
108. Id. at 3.
109. ABA Task Force Studies Bank Counsel Liability, supra note 17, at 6.
110. Weinstein, supra note 18, at 5 (footnote omitted). Weinstein cites four cases as
specific support for this assertion: Dawson v. McWilliams, 146 F.2d 38 (5th Cir. 1944); Phoe-
nix Indem. Co. v. Marquette Casualty Co., 320 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376
U.S. 938 (1964); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. United States Lines Co., 258 F.2d 374
(2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 910 (1959); Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Indem.
Ins. Co., 234 N.Y.S.2d 839 (1962). Weinstein, supra note 18, at n.6.
111. Weinstein, supra note 18, at 4.
112. Id. It is settled law that attorneys who represent organizations, i.e. financial depos-
itories, owe a duty to the institution itself, as opposed to the individual officers and directors.
"A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting through
its duty authorized constituents [i.e. the officers and directors]." MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 (Discussion Draft 1990). The FDIC, as receiver, can assert such
claims against attorneys, because as receiver, it stands in the shoes of the institution and its
shareholders and depositors. Thomas P. Vartanian & Michael D. Schley, Bank Officer and
Director Liability-Regulatory Actions, 39 Bus. LAW. 1021, 1028 (1984); see also Bank, Thrift
Attorneys React to Duties Outlined by OTS Chief Counsel Weinstein, 55 BNA's BANKING
REP. 547 (1990).
113. ABA Task Force Studies Bank Counsel Liability, supra note 17, at 1. Faith S.
Hochberg, Senior Deputy Counsel, Office of Thrift Supervision, argues the same position as
Weinstein. Id. In a talk given at the October 4, 1990 Prentice-Hall Law & Business confer-
ence, she provided instruction regarding the conduct of depository counsel. " '[I]n taking on
representation of a thrift, be careful to heed that your duty is to the entity and all of its equity
holders, depositors and creditors . . .[C]ounsel your clients about their fiduciary duty to the
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ment, by virtue of its insurance of depositors' accounts, has the para-
mount interest in the safety and soundness of insured depository
institutions."'' 1
4
Weinstein cites the perspective of the federal government as eq-
uity investor to support his argument. "[C]orporate fiduciaries owe
their duties to those who provide the equity with which an institu-
tion operates." 15 The federal government has taken on a major eq-
uity position in every insured depository institution by providing de-
posit insurance.' 16 Therefore, the government demands the highest
level of fiduciary duty from the institution and institution-affiliated
parties, because it "has an unlimited negative equity risk while it has
none of the potential for gain that common shareholders enjoy.) 117
Weinstein also draws upon the notion of the debtor/creditor re-
lationship to bolster his proposal."' "[A] debtor who is insolvent or
nearly so owes a fiduciary duty to creditors ... to avoid losses to the
creditors.""' 9 The federal government is considered the primary
creditor to depositories, since it insures loss.' 2 0 Because the govern-
ment is exposed to a potentially infinite risk of loss, "fiduciaries of
an insolvent or close to insolvent thrift institution [should] be primar-
ily concerned with the interests of that institution's largest creditor,
e.g., the U.S. government. "121
Weinstein relies on this formula to argue that fiduciaries of de-
positories are not allowed to take risks with their depositors'
money. 122 Therefore, counsel may not advise their clients to take
such risks, even if it potentially could produce a large reward. The
practices of counsel and their clients must at all times be safe and
sound and never even potentially unsafe and unsound. "The only
conscionable legal conclusion is that the directors owe a fiduciary
duty to the holder of the potentially unlimited negative equity risk,
e.g. the United States government, and that directors who fail to con-
sider the potential effect of the transaction on the government breach
their duty.' 23
United States of America." Id. at 5.
114. Weinstein, supra note 18, at 5 (footnote omitted).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 5-6.
117. Id. at 6.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 6-7.
120. Id. at 7.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 11.
123. Id. at 12.
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It is against Weinstein's extreme suggestion that the fact scena-
rios posed are tested to determine the attorney's duty and its outer
limits under FIRREA.124 This approach aids in the assessment of
the current trend under the law to hold attorneys personally liable
for failing banks, and it serves as a model on which attorneys may
structure their representation of financial institutions so as to avoid
such liability.
III. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The remainder of this comment critiques Harris Weinstein's
proposal to determine its validity and utility. This examination pro-
vides a better understanding of his model, so that it can be applied to
the fact scenarios. The fact scenarios serve as examples of actions
that are clearly legal and illegal under FIRREA. Using these two
relatively clear-cut situations as building blocks, two additional fact
scenarios are examined that involve actions that are neither clearly
legal nor illegal, that is, unsafe and unsound under FIRREA. These
"gray areas" cause attorneys the greatest amount of concern, because
there is no definite standard on which lawyers can rely to determine
if their actions are technically illegal under FIRREA, or if they are
breaching their fiduciary duties.
Weinstein's proposal is applied to each fact scenario to further
test the model's usefulness and potential problems. The extent to
which lawyers can be personally liable under FIRREA also is ex-
amined in this context, with special attention paid to whether attor-
neys may give financial advice that qualifies as safe and sound, or
whether they should give financial advice at all. Moreover, the issue
of whether lawyers who discover that their client banks are know-
124. The fact scenarios, at least in part, are drawn from and based on several malprac-
tice cases brought by the FDIC against attorneys and their law firms now pending in federal
courts. FDIC v. Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott, 754 F. Supp 22 (E.D.N.Y. 1990); FDIC
v. Wise, 758 F. Supp. 1414 (D. Colo. 1991). The FDIC, for the most part, has argued Wein-
stein's theory in the complaints of these suits. These cases are also examined below. The ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the California Evidence Code are also used in the
analysis of attorney duty proposed by Weinstein. In addition, several cases, articles, and com-
ments are used, including: Huddleston v. Herman & McLean, 640 F.2d 534, 555 (5th Cir.
1981); FDIC v. Shrader & York, 777 F. Supp. 533 (S.D. Tex. 1991); Ohio, Louisiana Draft
Bills Would Limit Liability of Bank and Thrift Attorneys, 56 BNA's BANKING REP. 765
(1991); Advice on How to Exploit Loopholes May Be Unethical, OTS' Weinstein Says, 56
BNA's BANKING REP. 616 (1991); ABA Task Force Studies Liability of Counsel for Deposi-
tory Institutions, 55 BNA's BANKING REP. 755 (1990); FDIC Seeks $300 Million in Suit
Against Law Firm; Alleges Malpractice, Negligence, 54 BNA's BANKING REP. 547 (1990);
FDIC Will Target Attorney Malpractice; Agency Counsel Cautions Banking Lawyers, 54
BNA's BANKING REP. 545 (1990).
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ingly or recklessly engaged in, or are about to undertake, illegal ac-
tivities is explored. Under Weinstein's model, it is an open question
whether attorneys may protect themselves from personal liability by
resigning or if they must disclose the incriminating information to
the board of directors and/or the federal regulators. This issue raises
serious questions about the attorney-client relationship and the duty
of confidentiality.
In addition, assuming that Weinstein's model is applied "as is,"
this comment suggests how attorneys should structure their represen-
tation in the three classes of factual situations discussed, so that they
do not expose themselves to personal liability. Finally, the proposal
section outlines ways in which Weinstein's model should be modified
if it is to be applied by the FDIC and the courts.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Examination of Weinstein's Proposal
To fully understand Weinstein's position and to effectively ap-
ply it to the fact scenarios, support for and criticism of his theory
must be examined.
1. Support for Weinstein's Proposal
As well as the reasoning Weinstein uses in his short speech,
additional arguments exist that support his proposal. Since the time
he gave that speech, Weinstein has stated that his theory is based on
three basic principles attorneys serving as counsel to financial insti-
tutions must follow. First, Weinstein proposes that lawyers should
not only think of themselves as merely advocates representing clients
before neutral third parties, but also as counselors and advisors.125
Attorneys are not supposed to make business or financial decisions
for their clients, "but [they are supposed] to assist management with
an analysis on how to view the proposed action in the context of
law."12 Second, Weinstein asserts that lawyers owe a legal duty to
the institution itself, and not just to its employees, i.e., its officers and
directors, a theory that draws support from the Code of Professional
Responsibility.'1 7 Third, Weinstein argues that attorneys should
practice "whole law" and consider how their advice may affect
125. Ohio, Louisiana Draft Bills, supra note 124, at 766.
126. Id. at 767.
127. Id. at 766.
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others outside the institution, i.e., the taxpayers."'
These three criteria suggest that the attorney's duty is broader
than a duty owed just to the individual officers as clients, because the
institution is the client, not the individual officers. 29 The institution,
in turn, affects a great many people, because it is insured by the
federal government. Therefore, if the bank fails, federal tax dollars
are used for its bail-out. Before giving any advice, then, lawyers
must consider what impact that advice will have on the taxpayers, as
well as on their immediate clients.
Further support for Weinstein's position is related to the attor-
ney-client relationship and the way in which the federal government
becomes the lawyer's client. When the government takes over as re-
ceiver or as subrogee of a failed bank, it is then the client.' 8 There-
fore, the government can waive the attorney-client privilege and re-
quire the attorney to disclose any and all information that was
previously confidential and off-limits to the government.' In such
instances, attorneys need not worry about breaching the duty of con-
fidentiality owed to the client.
However, Weinstein's model also suggests that attorneys, be-
cause of their duty owed to the insurer, should disclose information
even before the bank fails and the government becomes the client.
This argument is one of prevention. Attorneys "might have privi-
leged access to information which the agency itself would not dis-
cover until long after the damage has been done."' 2 Attorneys, then,
can prevent damage to those who ultimately must pay for the bank's
failure, the taxpayers. Weinstein's model creates a climate where at-
torneys will be afraid to help their financial institution clients take
calculated risks that potentially could make its depositors a great
deal of money, and it possibly will induce lawyers to disclose confi-
dential information obtained through the attorney-client relationship,
so that they avoid exposure to personal liability.
FIRREA also lends support to Weinstein's argument. The stat-
ute expressly includes attorneys to financial institutions, along with
its officers and directors, as parties potentially liable for knowingly
128. Id. at 766-67. Weinstein defines "whole law as a comprehensive view of technical
regulatory standards, concepts of safety and soundness, concepts of fiduciary responsibility, and
... 'the principle that imposes hostility to law-avoidance schemes.' " Advice on How to Exploit
Loopholes, supra note 124, at 617.
129. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 (Discussion Draft 1990).
130. Bank, Thrift Attorneys React, supra note 112, at 547.
131. Id.
132. Baxter, supra note 6, at S255.
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or recklessly participating in unsafe and unsound banking prac-
tices."' Therefore, it can be argued by extrapolation that attorneys
now should be held to the higher standard of fiduciary duty to which
officers and directors of financial institutions traditionally have been
held."" Bank officers must answer to the federal regulators, and so
should attorneys for financial institutions.
2. Criticism of Weinstein's Proposal
In a recent article, Keith Fisher stated, "[t]he notion that coun-
sel to the [financial] institution are also representing the depositors
[and the federal government as insurer] is hardly an accepted
one." 135 Weinstein's position has been highly criticized by other at-
torneys, because it creates an inherent conflict of interest between the
duty owed to the client and to the federal government, and it "ig-
nores the separate judicial existence of the [financial] institution."' 30
Two separate areas of Weinstein's proposal must be addressed.
The first issue is his opinion that attorneys owe a fiduciary duty to
the depositors, and by extension, to the federal government as in-
surer. This notion includes the problems Weinstein's model creates
with respect to the attorney-client privilege. The second issue is re-
lated to the first: whether the extension of personal liability to attor-
neys is warranted and what effects this liability has on the quality of
legal representation and the ability of banks to conduct business.
a. Do Attorneys Owe a Fiduciary Duty to the Federal
Government?
Weinstein relies on hornbook principle and four cases to sup-
port his assertion that the insurer is subrogated to the rights of the
insured.' 37 This point is not controversial. However, Weinstein then
makes two "leaps" from this accepted and established law to support
his proposal. The first leap is that because the FDIC insures the
depositors and is subrogated their rights, attorneys for financial insti-
133. 12 U.S.C.S. § 1813(u) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
134. Clearman, supra note 46, at 103.
135. Fisher, supra note 3, at 10.
136. Id. at 10.
137. Weinstein, supra note 18, at 5; Dawson v. McWilliams, 146 F.2d 38 (5th Cir.
1944); Phoenix Indem. Co. v. Marquette Casualty Co., 320 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. United States Lines Co., 258
F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 910 (1959); Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v.
Indem. Ins. Co., 234 N.Y.S.2d 839 (1962).
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tutions owe the federal government some sort of fiduciary duty.1"8
This fact is true, at least to the extent that the FDIC becomes the
client when it takes over the failed bank as receiver.1 9 Weinstein's
second assertion, however, is very radical. He claims that attorneys
owe the federal government as insurer the highest form of fiduciary
duty, a duty potentially greater than that owed to the client institu-
tion."" The cases on which Weinstein relies do not support these
"leaps".
While these four cases do support Weinstein's assertion that the
insurer is subrogated the rights of the insured,141 they may be distin-
guished on their facts from the context in which Weinstein uses
them. Plaintiffs in each case are private insurance companies, and
the claims at issue are either for personal injury,142 wrongful
death, 4" or damage to personal property."4 Of these cases, only two
involve the loss of money, and these losses are results of accidents,
not business transactions. 45 Furthermore, the federal government is
not involved in any of these cases, nor do these decisions have any-
thing to do with financial institutions or attorneys.
At best, then, these four cases support the notion that fiduciaries
owe some sort of duty to the insurer as subrogee, which probably
makes Weinstein's first leap sound and rational. It is reasonable to
charge attorneys with some degree of duty to depositors. Banks owe
their depositors a duty of loyalty,"" and attorneys owe a fiduciary
duty to their client banks. By extrapolation, then, attorneys owe a
fiduciary duty to the depositors. The obligation to the institution in-
cludes the duty to avoid "unsafe and unsound" practices, 47 both be-
cause such practices are financially risky for the client, and also be-
138. Weinstein, supra note 18, at 4.
139. Bank, Thrift Attorneys React, supra note 112, at 547.
140. Id. "Every fiduciary of a federally insured depository institution owes the federal
insurer, at the very minimum, the very same high fiduciary duties that are owed depositors...
Weinstein, supra note 18, at 5 (emphasis added).
141. Dawson, 146 F.2d, at 42-43; Phoenix Indem. Co., 320 F.2d, at 493; St. Paul Fire
& Marine Ins. Co., 258 F.2d, at 376; Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 234 N.Y.S.2d, at 843.
142. Phoenix Indem. Co. v. Marquette Casualty Co., 320 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964).
143. Dawson v. McWilliams, 146 F.2d 38 (5th Cir. 1944).
144. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. United States Lines Co., 258 F.2d 374 (2d Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 910 (1959); Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Indem. Ins. Co.,
234 N.Y.S.2d 839 (1962).
145. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 258 F.2d, at 374; Employers Mut. Liab. Ins.
Co., 234 N.Y.S.2d, at 839.
146. Vartanian & Schley, supra note 112, at 1029.
147. 12 U.S.C.S. § 1813(u)(4)(c) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992). "Unsafe and unsound"
practices are technically illegal under FIRREA. Id.
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cause they could get the client into trouble with the federal
regulators. These concerns are often synonymous with the interests
of the depositors. When the bank loses money, its depositors lose
money. Thus, if attorneys are required to observe this duty, a large
part of Weinstein's objective, i.e., the prevention of risky banking
practices, is achieved.
Assuming attorneys do owe a fiduciary duty to the federal gov-
ernment as insurer, two additional questions arise. The first issue is
whether the duty owed to the depositors and government is higher
than that owed to the client institution. While the obligation to de-
positors clearly exists, it is not necessarily a higher fiduciary obliga-
tion than the one owed to the client financial institution. This idea
that attorneys owe their greatest fiduciary duty to the depositors, and
by extension to the federal government as insurer, is wholly unsub-
stantiated by the cases on which Weinstein relies. These judicial de-
cisions make no mention of attorney duty, they do not deal with the
federal government as insurer, nor do they relate to the financial
dealings of banks. This final great "leap" is the single biggest weak-
ness in Weinstein's theory, and it is the source of most of the contro-
versy surrounding his proposed approach.
The second question, assuming that there is some duty owed by
lawyers to depositors, is whether there is an affirmative obligation on
attorneys to disclose confidential information to the federal regulators
if and when attorneys, through the course of representing client
banks, discover that the thrifts are engaged in (potentially) illegal
banking practices. This issue is inherently connected to the notion of
attorney-client privilege. In fact, Weinstein's model wreaks havoc
with traditional notions of the privilege and of client confidentiality.
Because lawyers are supposed to act in the best interests of deposi-
tors above all else, 48 Weinstein would assert that under these cir-
cumstances the duty to the federal government as insurer should pre-
vail over attorney-client confidences if observance of the duty
prevents financial loss.
However, the duty of attorneys to the depositors and the federal
government as insurer is not greater than the duty lawyers owe to
their client banks. Therefore, a duty is not imposed on attorneys to
disclose information regarding (potentially) unsafe and unsound
practices that was obtained through the confidentiality of the attor-
ney-client relationship. In fact, such disclosure is not permitted, and
said divulgence actually constitutes a breach of the lawyer's duty to
148. Weinstein, supra note 18, at 4.
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maintain attorney-client confidentiality. According to the lawyers for
Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, "[California's] rule of client confidenti-
ality puts client loyalty and the duty to keep client loyalty private
above all else. It allows no exceptions. Further, the American Bar
Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct forbid revealing
information to sources outside the company."149
The duty of an attorney to maintain client confidences is funda-
mental to the jurisprudential system. Many ethical codes require, al-
most at all costs, that lawyers not divulge any information given to
them by their clients in confidence.' 5 ' According to the American
Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct (hereinafter
Model Rules), "[a] fundamental principle in the client-lawyer rela-
tionship is that the lawyer maintain confidentiality of information
relating to the representation. The client is thereby encouraged to
communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embar-
rassing or legally damaging subject matter."' 151 Weinstein's theory
contradicts the very fiber of representation and advocacy represented
in these codes. In addition, Weinstein draws on the old Model Code
of Professional Responsibility for support of his ideas. However, he
ignores the newer version, i.e., the Model Rules, which completely
contradicts his position.
For example, Model Rule 1.6 states:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representa-
tion of a client unless the client consents after consultation, ex-
cept...
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information .. (1) to prevent the
client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is
likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily
harm.'62
This duty of confidentiality continues even after the attorney-client
relationship is severed.' 53 Weinstein's model and supporting argu-
ments are completely at odds with these well-established rules. Un-
less there is some kind of homicidal plot or imminent threat of seri-
149. Rutter, supra note 2, at 83. For a discussion of the FDIC's malpractice suit
against Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, see infra note 186 and accompanying text.
150. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (Discussion Draft
1990); CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 952-956 (West 1991).
151. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt. 4 (1990). Some form of
the Model Rules has been adopted by 35 states, and the Model Rules have replaced the old
Model Code of Professional Responsibility.
152. Id. Rule 1.6 (emphasis added).
153. Id. Rule 1.6 cmts. 15, 21.
[Vol. 33
FIRREA
ous physical harm related to particular dealings of a financial
institution, lawyers are expressly not allowed to disclose any infor-
mation given to them by their clients, nor are attorneys permitted to
divulge original ideas discussed between themselves and their clients,
including all advice given to the clients by the attorneys. 154
Model Rule 1.13 supports the above argument and, in turn,
also contradicts Weinstein's theory. 55
(b) If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer ... is
engaged in action .. that is a violation of a legal obligation to
the organization, or a violation of law which reasonably might
be imputed to the organization, and is likely to result in sub-
stantial injury to the organization, the lawyer shall proceed as is
reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. 156
In such cases, the only option available to attorneys involving proper
disclosure of the information is to refer the matter to a higher au-
thority in the organization. 157 There is no mention of a requirement
to inform the federal government in this or any other rule.
The California Evidence Code (hereinafter CEC) is a bit more
lenient, but it too fails to support Weinstein's proposal. According to
CEC section 956, "There is no privilege under this article if the
services of the lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid any-
one to commit or plan to commit a crime or fraud.' 58 This code
section covers clearly illegal activities, but it still does not mandate
that attorneys disclose potentially risky or "cutting edge" transac-
tions made by the banks or the financial advice the lawyer provided
to the institution.
Weinstein's proposal that attorneys have a duty to disclose con-
fidential information regarding their clients' potentially illegal ac-
tions transforms the attorney from counselor and advocate of the in-
stitution to regulator and insurer of the client's good faith.159 Under
Weinstein's model, clients must always think twice before discussing
anything with their attorneys, because the possibility exists that their
lawyers might divulge the information to the federal regulators. Such
candor could come back to haunt the officers and directors as individ-
uals in enforcement or penalty proceedings by the federal regulators.
As a result, the attorney-client relationship becomes an adversary
154. Id. Rule 1.6.
155. Id. Rule 1.13.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. CAL. EVID. CODE § 956 (West 1991).
159. Fisher, supra note 3, at 11.
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process, and the working relationship, which is supposedly based on
trust, 160 is severely compromised. The result is a definite chilling ef-
fect on the relationship. According to one commentator:
Efforts by the government to impose responsibility upon law-
yers to assure the quality of their clients' compliance with the
law or to compel lawyers to give advice resolving all doubts in
favor of regulatory restrictions would evoke serious and far-
reaching disruption in the role of the lawyer as counselor,
which would be detrimental to the public, clients and the legal
profession."'
The only time that a duty to disclose confidential information to
regulators ever exists, then, is at the time the federal government
takes over as receiver of a failed institution. Once the FDIC has
stepped into the shoes of the depositors as subrogee, it is then the
client. The attorney-client privilege stays with the client, so the gov-
ernment can, in a sense, "waive" the privilege and require attorneys
to disclose any and all of the information related to the institution.
162
At this stage of the representation, the attorney may be required to
disclose confidential information to the regulators, but such disclo-
sure will not compromise the attorney-client privilege.
b. Expansion of Personal Liability for Attorneys and Its
Effect on Legal Representation of Financial Institutions
Assuming attorneys do owe an obligation both to the client bank
and to the insurer, it does not necessarily follow that lawyers should
be personally liable if they protect their clients at the expense of the
depositors and insurer; nor does it mean that they should be held
personally liable if they fail to make disclosures to the federal regu-
lators that would violate the attorney-client privilege. Weinstein's
model attempts to create a new standard of attorney liability where
one did not previously exist. As Max L. Gilliam, a defense attorney
for Jones Day, stated:
[wihat these lawsuits are seeking [by employing Weinstein's
model] is to impose a liability on lawyers that does not exist
under the Rules of Professional Conduct. That is, if you are
advising a client in a regulated industry - and that's most of
160. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt. 4 (Discussion Draft
1990).
161. Lehr, supra note 21, at 62 (quoting American Bar Ass'n, 1975 Statement of Pol-
icy, 31 Bus. LAW. 543, 545 (1975)).
162. Bank, Thrift Attorneys React, supra note 112, at 547.
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your corporate clients - you tell the regulators what you dis-
cover or be liable for it. That strikes at the heart of the way we
practice law. 6
Another problem with Weinstein's theory is that because the
duties placed on attorneys are not clearly defined, attorneys are
likely "to err on the side of excessive caution, perhaps even to the
ultimate detriment of the general prosperity of the industry.""' At-
torneys may become too concerned with exposing themselves to per-
sonal liability by providing advice to the institution regarding any
potentially illegal transaction, so they might inform the federal regu-
lators about everything just to protect themselves. Such a practice
might keep officers and directors from disclosing information to, or
discussing important ideas with, their attorneys. Therefore, financial
institutions might not obtain legal opinions before conducting a po-
tentially illegal transaction, which they would not otherwise under-
take if they had consulted their lawyer. Failing to obtain legal opin-
ions regarding transactions could cause banks to become overly
cautious and to abstain from engaging in innovative deals altogether.
This result would stifle progress in the world of finance and, in ad-
dition, would produce a chilling effect on the attorney-client
relationship.
B. Fact Scenarios
Even though Weinstein's arguments are flawed, and the ABA
Task Force believes that Weinstein's "new emphasis on attorney lia-
bility is without substantive legal basis,"' 65 attorneys must prepare
for the worst and assume that Weinstein's proposal will become
law. 66 Because "[miany legal malpractice and liability policies ex-
clude criminal claims based on gross negligence . ..and some ex-
clude coverage for suits brought by the FDIC,"' 67 it is critical for
attorneys to understand what their duties are as counsel to financial
institutions and to whom these duties are owed.' 68 In addition, attor-
neys must develop a way to effectively represent banks while at the
same time protect themselves from exposure to personal liability.
Consideration of specific fact situations outlining actions that are
163. Rutter, supra note 2, at 31.
164. Baxter, supra note 6, at S255.
165. ABA Task Force Studies Liability, supra note 124, at 756.
166. Id.
167. FDIC Seeks $300 Million in Suit, supra note 124, at 547.
168. Fisher, supra note 3, at 4.
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clearly legal and illegal, as well as actions that are not as clear-cut,
are examined and used as a backdrop for the development of such a
scheme.
1. Attorneys' Actions Which Are Clearly Legal Under
FIRREA and Their Relation to Weinstein's Model
A recent example of an attorney's actions that were clearly legal
comes from the case of FDIC v. Shrader & York.' 69 The law firm of
Shrader & York served as legal counsel to two S&Ls, City Savings
and Loan Association (hereinafter City) and Lamar Savings Associa-
tion (hereinafter Lamar).' ° The FDIC, as receiver standing in the
shoes of the institution, sued the firm for legal malpractice, alleging
that the firm was negligent in failing to instruct the two S&Ls "to
obtain regulatory approval for certain. business transactions." '
The court disagreed with the FDIC, stating that even if it were
malpractice for the firm not to instruct the institution to obtain regu-
latory approval for the transactions, plaintiff failed to show that the
firm's omission "proximately caused the financial loss [of the share-
holders] complained of by Plaintiff.' 1 7 2 The court also quoted Hud-
dleston v. Herman & McLean 7 3 stating, "[clausing a party to enter
a transaction that loses money does not make the procuring party
liable for the transactional loss.' 1 74 Shrader & York were found not
liable for their failure to give legal advice, even though it caused the
S&Ls to enter into transactions that lost money. 17
5
Because Shrader & York is a recent case, FIRREA could have
been employed to impose liability on the firm. Since Shrader & York
were found not liable, however, it can be inferred that their actions
did not constitute knowing or reckless participation in unsafe and
unsound banking practices under FIRREA. Even if the actual in-
vestment were unsafe and unsound, that fact is irrelevant, because
the attorneys were only providing the bank with advice on a legal
issue, i.e., whether regulatory approval for the transaction was re-
quired. An attorney's interpretation of a law or statute, and the law-
169. FDIC v. Shrader & York, 777 F. Supp. 533 (S.D. Tex. 1991).
170. Id. at 534.
171. Id. These transactions included "City's acquisition of Realty Development Com-
pany in 1983; Lamar's acquisition of Brazos Savings Association in 1983; Lamar's acquisition
of stock in CTC Corporation in 1985; and the purchase of Stone Oak property in 1985." Id.
172. Id.
173. Huddleston v. Herman & McLean, 640 F.2d 534, 555 (5th Cir. 1981), affd in
part and rev'd in part, 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
174. Shrader & York, 777 F. Supp. at 535.
175. Id.
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yer's subsequent instructions to the bank regarding that law, are
clearly legal as long as they are based on good-faith advice.1"6 Even
if the attorney knows such advice is illegal, i.e., unsafe and unsound,
he or she can not be held personally liable under FIRREA if that
illegality does not cause the loss.17 Because their acts were clearly
legal, the firm did not have a duty to disclose this information to the
federal government as insurer, as Weinstein would suggest. There
was no reason for the firm to suspect that the transactions would be
financially disastrous.
The application of Weinstein's model to attorneys' actions that
are clearly legal, that is, safe and sound under FIRREA, has no
effect on how attorneys should act in such circumstances. Because
their actions are legal, there is no cause for alarm. As a result, there
is no need to inform the federal regulators, because they are not
needed to step in and prevent financial disaster. The attorney's duty,
therefore, remains to the institution.
2. Attorneys' Actions Which Are Clearly Illegal Under
FIRREA and Their Relation to Weinstein's Model
In contrast to the above example, Weinstein's model has a defi-
nite effect on clearly illegal actions by attorneys or the institutions
they represent. Examination of two current cases demonstrates this
point.
FDIC v. Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott 178 is a prime ex-
ample of egregious action taken by an attorney, assuming that the
alleged facts are true. The FDIC claimed that "Eckert [the attorney]
facilitated and advanced Bernstein's [client director of the Guardian
Bank, N.A.] personal goals by, inter alia, structuring transactions
designed to provide Bernstein with access to millions of dollars in
cash for his personal use, free from the scrutiny of bank examin-
ers."1 9 Bernstein owned approximately 85% of the Guardian Bank,
N.A. (hereinafter Guardian) stock, and wanted to use his control of
Guardian to supply Guardian's mortgage-servicing subsidiary with
money, "regardless of the harmful effects on the bank."1 '' These
plans included Bernstein's personal use of the money to purchase
176. H.R. REP. No. 101-54(I), supra note 77, at 263.
177. For an attorney to be held personally liable, the "unsafe and unsound practice
[must cause or be] likely to cause more than a minimum financial loss. ... 12 U.S.G.S.
§ 1813(u) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
178. FDIC v. Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott, 754 F.Supp 22 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
179. Id. at 23.
180. Id.
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Guardian's subsidiaries and pay off some of his other private
obligations.181
It is also alleged that Eckert knew Bernstein planned to use
these transactions for his own personal gain, and that Eckert still did
not disclose these activities to the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency.182 This allegation is substantiated by a memo written by
Eckert, "which later called for all directors to be 'fully informed' [of
the transactions]." '83
Assuming the alleged facts are true, these acts by Eckert qualify
as knowing and reckless, as well as unsafe and unsound. Eckert
knew the real purpose of the transaction, which was to benefit Bern-
stein personally, yet he went ahead and drafted the deals anyway in
disregard of their potential adverse effects on Guardian. In addition,
Eckert transferred Guardian's money to Bernstein as an individual,
knowing that Bernstein would not use the money for the bank's ben-
efit and that Guardian would end up losing money; these acts consti-
tuted an unnecessary financial risk to the bank and its depositors. 84
This risk, then, is an unsafe and unsound banking practice according
to FIRREA.'85
An argument exists, however, that these acts were not clearly
illegal. Since Bernstein owned 85% of Guardian's stock, he could be
considered the client, or at the very least his interests and the inter-
ests of the shareholders could be identical. It was arguably not a
breach of fidvciary duty, then, for Eckert to structure the transac-
tions to benefit Eckert personally. This argument suggests that
Weinstein's notion of fiduciary obligation to depositors would not af-
fect the actions of attorneys in such cases, since the client institution
and the shareholders are essentially the same entity. Therefore, the
attorneys did not breach their fiduciary obligations to the client.
However, shareholders and depositors are not the same entity, and
their financial interests are not always the same. The Eckert case is a
clear example of this proposition. Thus, if the attorneys also owe a
duty to the depositors as Weinstein suggests, then Eckert's actions
are a clear breach of this duty. Accordingly, the application of Wein-
stein's model makes a huge difference with respect to how attorneys
are supposed to act in such cases, because the model raises questions
about to whom attorneys owe fiduciary duties.
181. FDIC Seeks $300 Million in Suit, supra note 124, at 547.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Clearman, supra note 46, at 103.
185. 12 U.S.C.S. § 1813(u) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
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To further understand the effect of Weinstein's proposal on
lawyers' actions when the client is engaged in clearly illegal activity,
another example must be considered. The law firm of Jones, Day,
Reavis & Pogue has been sued by the Resolution Trust Corporation
(hereinafter RTC) based on the following allegations:
Jones Day assisted . . . in concealing vital information from
examiners and manufacturing documents for files, helping ...
create after-the-fact ratifications for [oral] transactions . . . [re-
moving] incriminating . .. documents from at least one file
. . [and] allowing forgeries of minutes and resolutions to con-
tinue . . . . Jones Day failed to notify the Lincoln board of
directors or regulators of the fraudulent activity. . . Instead,
Jones day acquiesced in, assisted, and cooperated in the
deceptions.18
If these alleged facts are true, they would certainly qualify as clearly
illegal. The knowing and reckless standard is satisfied, since any
competent attorney knows that it is illegal to forge and manufacture
documents. It is also unsafe and unsound for Jones Day to conceal
that information from the federal examiners. While doing so could
potentially avoid immediate regulatory enforcement action and the
assessment of civil money penalties against Lincoln Savings & Loan
for violations of FIRREA or other banking regulations, the law firm
exposes Lincoln Savings & Loan to potentially greater penalties in
the long run. The longer a violation of FIRREA continues, for ex-
ample, the larger the total civil money penalty becomes.18
Weinstein's model has no effect on the actions of attorneys and
officers or directors in such circumstances for the very reason that
these actions are clearly illegal. Weinstein argues that lawyers owe
the highest fiduciary duty to the federal government as insurer.1 88
However, if attorneys are engaged in illegal activity, they are by def-
inition ignoring whatever fiduciary duty to the depositors that is sup-
posedly placed upon them. The illegalities are committed for per-
sonal gain, and the best interests of the financial institution are most
likely ignored as a result. The last thing lawyers in this position
would do is inform the federal regulators of their acts, because they
want to avoid enforcement proceedings by the federal regulators
altogether.
Along similar lines, Weinstein's approach would not aid in the
186. Rutter, supra note 2, at 31.
187. 12 U.S.C.S. § 1818(i)(2)(A)-(G) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
188. Weinstein, supra note 18, at 4.
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enforcement of illegal action taken by financial institutions' officers
and directors. Because they are engaged in illegal activity, the of-
ficers and directors would be wary about telling anyone, including
the board of directors, for fear that the information would reach the
federal regulators. Lawyers would be unlikely candidates to learn of
this illegal activity, even in spite of the attorney-client privilege, be-
cause the officers and directors would not risk the exposure. Hence,
the only way Weinstein's model would be of any use here is if the
officers and directors asked the attorney to help them commit the
illegal transactions and the lawyer refused.
Therefore, even if Weinstein's ideas were valid and practical,
they would not be useful as a means of regulating attorneys in the
context of actions that are clearly illegal. However, Weinstein's
model does affect lawyers' actions when they learn of, but are not
involved in, clearly illegal activities by their client banks. This issue
is discussed below.
3. Gray Areas - Attorneys' Actions That Are Neither
Clearly Legal Nor Clearly Illegal Under FIRREA and Their
Relation to Weinstein's Model
The situations in which Weinstein's model has the most signifi-
cant impact on an attorney's actions are those where the bank's un-
dertakings are neither clearly legal nor clearly illegal. There are two
interrelated reasons for this effect. First, attorneys become privy to a
great deal of confidential information about the bank and its finan-
cial dealings during the course of the representation. Second, this
confidential information may concern dealings that are potentially,
but not clearly, unsafe and unsound. These two factors provide much
of the support for Weinstein's model. Attorneys are in the best posi-
tion to obtain this confidential information about potentially hazard-
ous banking practices, so they should be the ones to inform the fed-
eral regulators. However, if attorneys are not certain whether the
acts are illegal, i.e., unsafe and unsound, and they inform the federal
regulators, the possibility exists that lawyers would be preventing
banks from having the opportunity to engage in cutting-edge, per-
fectly legal transactions. This conflict raises questions regarding the
duties charged to attorneys in this context and to whom these duties
are owed.
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a. Fact Scenario 1 - Acquisition, Development, and
Construction Loans
The best way to deal with these issues is to examine several fact
patterns where it is unsettled whether the actions taken by the attor-
ney and/or the bank violate the unsafe and unsound provision of
FIRREA. For example, it is technically legal for attorneys to advise
their clients how to take advantage of loopholes in the law.189 How-
ever, the key to determining attorney liability under Weinstein's
model,,and also under FIRREA, is whether lawyers may provide
such advice to their clients where attorneys are certain that the use of
the loophole is legal in and of itself but may be financially risky, i.e.,
unsafe and unsound, and therefore illegal under FIRREA. In other
words, can the lawyer render legal advice without reaching a conclu-
sion as to whether the practice is financially unsafe and unsound. A
related issue is whether attorneys must disclose confidential informa-
tion to federal regulators if they learn that the banks are using this
loophole, which may be unsafe and unsound financial practice, and
the regulators are not aware of it.
To answer these questions, consider the following example con-
cerning the accounting loophole used in the financial accounting pro-
cedure for acquisition, development, and construction (hereinafter
ADC) loans, as explained by William K. Black, District Counsel for
the San Francisco District, Office of Thrift Supervision. 9 ° An ADC
loan is usually given for the purpose of purchasing land and develop-
ing it with large commercial buildings.19 Often the borrower is
loaned a large amount of cash for no money down and does not have
to begin repayment of the principal and interest for two to five
years.' 92 The accounting loophole for ADC loans may be employed
when the lender chooses to carry the business risk of project failure;
if the building is unprofitable, the bank's loan is not repaid.' 93 When
the lender carries the risk, "an ADC loan is treated as a direct in-
vestment by the regulators and is supposed to be treated that way by
accountants." 94 The, bank then " 'pays' itself the interest due [on the
189. Loopholes are defined as ambiguities or omissions in a statute. Lehr, supra note
21, at 57.
190. Hearing, supra note 8, at 286-89. This loophole was exploited by Lincoln Savings
& Loan, which is a major reason behind the institution's financial failure. Id. at 286. FIR-
REA largely closes this loophole, but not necessarily for state-chartered banks.
191. Id. at 287.
192. Id. at 288.
193. Id. at 287.
194. Id. at 288.
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loan] out of an 'interest reserve'," which translates as an immediate
statement of profit for the thrift.195 This "paper profit" is "false,"
however, since the bank has not received any money from an outside
source. Consequently, the thrift's overall net worth becomes falsely
inflated.
In addition to the above factors, ADC loans of this type are
clearly unsafe and unsound under FIRREA for three reasons. First,
"[t]hey are generally of an extremely high loan to value ratio, mean-
ing a downturn in the economy, or in some cases a lack of property
value inflation, leaves the lender unprotected by the collateral secur-
ing the loan."' 98 Second, the lender has no way to recover the
amount of the loan from the borrower if the venture loses money,
because the lender either has agreed to hold the borrower not liable,
or the borrower has little, if any, net worth. 9 ' Third, "real estate
projects are frequently speculative, i.e., there is no one legally com-
mitted (and financially capable) of buying the project once it is
built."' 98 However, higher interest rates can be charged for riskier
projects, which enables the bank to claim larger profits, further in-
flating the net worth of the thrift in a deceptive manner. 99 When
these three factors are combined with poor underwriting, i.e., no
down payment required and little or no collateral secured for the
loan, the likelihood of financial loss to the bank, and by extension, to
the depositors and taxpayers, is substantial.200
The use of this accounting practice is clearly not confidential,
because it goes on the bank's books. Therefore, when the federal reg-
ulators conduct a routine inspection, the information is disclosed.
What may be confidential, however, is the attorney's advice to the
bank regarding the wisdom of exploiting such loopholes. It is not
clear whether lawyers have an affirmative duty to disclose such ad-
vice to the federal government should their clients employ the
loophole.
The legislative history to FIRREA suggests that attorneys
should not be held personally liable for instructing their clients to
take advantage of accounting loopholes.
195. Id. at 288, 294.
196. Id. at 289.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 297. An argument exists that if these ADC loan losses are unsafe and un-
sound by definition, it is never justified to advise an institution that it is proper to proceed with
them.
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By specifying "attorney" in this section [12 U.S.C. § 1813(u)],
the Committee does not intend to subject attorneys to agency
enforcement actions for those good faith activities falling within
the traditional attorney-client relationship. Specifically, provid-
ing advice in good faith to a client financial institution, by itself,
should not lead to an enforcement action . . . . However, an
attorney who does provide legal advice and services and then
knowingly participates in other activities which result in serious
misconduct would be subject to enforcement actions. Moreover,
repeated legal advice to violate a banking law provision . . .
where the meaning of the provision is clearly established or set-
tled by the courts, would not usually constitute good faith, and
could possibly subject the attorney involved to enforcement ac-
tion, if the grounds for such an action are present .... 0'
This language suggests that FIRREA is designed to deal with
outright fraud of attorneys rather than breach of fiduciary obliga-
tions. Use of loopholes is not outright fraud as long as attorneys be-
lieve in good faith that its use is legal. Lawyers, then, should not be
held responsible for advising their banking clients to utilize those
loopholes, assuming the loopholes are not being used to perpetuate
fraud or delay or to hide its detection. Also, loopholes are often cre-
ated for a specific purpose. As one commentator declared, "[s]eeming
statutory omissions or ambiguities may indeed be the result of con-
gressional compromise, and thus such 'openings' should be available
as avenues of corporate [and banking] conduct until closed by appro-
priate legislative act."2 °2
In addition, the meaning of the provision "unsafe and unsound"
in the context of FIRREA has not yet been clearly established or
settled by the courts. Therefore, if there is some doubt in lawyers'
minds that the advice possibly could be unsafe and unsound, attor-
neys should be able to provide their clients with this advice without
worrying about personal exposure to enforcement proceedings. Even
if banking clients use their lawyers' advice to further a criminal
scheme, lawyers do not become party to that course of action as long
as the advice was provided in good faith with a solid legal basis.2"'
Weinstein's view is that "attorneys who discover [loopholes]
must then ask whether the use of the loophole poses safety, sound-
ness, or fiduciary considerations . . . . [A]ttorneys who advise clients
201. H.R. REP. No. 101-54(1), supra note 77, at 263.
202. Lehr, supra note 21, at 61.
203. Id.; see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 (Discussion
Draft 1990).
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on how to exploit legislative or regulatory 'loopholes' may be guilty
of unethical practice . ".. 204 Therefore, if it is unsafe and unsound
to use the loophole, it would also be unsafe and unsound for lawyers
to counsel their clients to use it. Because the use of this accounting
loophole for ADC loans is clearly unsafe and unsound financially, it
is probably unsafe and unsound for attorneys to advise their clients
to use it under Weinstein's model. Even though the thrift shows im-
mediate paper profits, these are losses in reality. If the bank issues a
large number of ADC loans and bears the risk of loss, it is likely
that the bank will become insolvent after two years.20 5 Since Wein-
stein believes that attorneys owe the highest standard of fiduciary
duty to the federal government, he would argue that lawyers have an
affirmative duty to inform the regulators if advice to exploit such
loopholes were given to their clients.
Even assuming that it is unsafe and unsound for attorneys to
instruct their clients to use accounting loopholes, the attorney-client
privilege, as outlined in Model Rules 1.6 and 1.13, as well as Cali-
fornia Evidence Code section 954, precludes disclosure of this advice
to the federal government. According to these two rules, the attor-
ney's duty of confidentiality overrides all other concerns. As long as
the accounting loophole poses no threat of substantial bodily
harm,20 6 or the attorney was not asked to help the client use the
loophole to perpetuate a crime or fraud,2"7 the advice may not be
revealed to the federal government.
A related issue is what duties are imposed on lawyers if they
discover that the financial institution is using the legal accounting
loophole to disguise the true, fraudulent nature of the transaction
from the depositors and federal regulators. Lawyers may choose
from several possible courses of action in this case. They definitely
must advise their clients against defrauding the government and the
depositors in this or any other manner.208 If this advice is not fol-
lowed, and often it is not,'0 9 attorneys should at the very least inform
the board of directors of the illegal action. 10 If the board does not
take steps to rectify the problem, lawyers also have the option to
204. Advice on How to Exploit Loopholes, supra note 124, at 616.
205. Hearing, supra note 8, at 291-92.
206. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 (Discussion Draft 1990).
207. CAL. EvID. CODE § 956 (West 1991).
208. Rutter, supra note 2, at 33.
209. Id.
210. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 (Discussion Draft 1990).
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resign as counsel.211 Only under certain circumstances, however,
may attorneys inform the federal regulators of their clients' actions,
even if the actions are illegal. Lawyers are bound by the attorney-
client privilege to keep such information confidential, unless they are
approached by their clients for the purpose of using the loophole to
perpetuate a crime or fraud.21 Under all other circumstances, attor-
neys may not reveal their findings.
It is not clear, however, whether any of these options would
insulate lawyers from personal liability under Weinstein's model.
Since Weinstein would require that this information be disclosed to
the federal regulators before the bank fails and the federal govern-
ment takes over as insurer, the only way attorneys could avoid per-
sonal liability under Weinstein's theory is to disclose the information
to the federal government.
In this hypothetical context, Weinstein's model would have a
tremendous effect on the attorney-client relationship, which could
potentially result in even greater financial loss to banks. Assuming
lawyers would be compelled to inform the government that their cli-
ent thrifts are using the loophole, bank officers and directors would
never even discuss the use of loopholes with the bank's lawyers for
fear that the lawyers would blow the whistle on the transaction. As a
result, the officers and directors would attempt to use the loophole
without asking their attorneys how to implement the tactic properly.
Without expert advice, these laypeople might utilize the loophole in-
correctly and unknowingly break the law. The banks could suffer
monetary loss through the transaction; even worse, they could be-
come subject to federal regulatory action for breaking the law. By
not consulting with their attorneys, banks who wish to take advan-
tage of loopholes stand to lose a great deal under Weinstein's model,
and the attorney-client relationship is compromised, as well.
b. Fact Scenario 2 - The Legality of Attorneys
Providing Financial Advice to Their Clients
The most pervasive gray area of all involves attorneys giving
financial advice to client banks. The problem is based on the fact
that many officers and directors of financial institutions have finan-
cial training and are better qualified than lawyers to make such deci-
sions. As one commentator noted, "Traditional legal advice encom-
passes a wide-array of activity ranging from oral consultations to
211. Id.
212. CAL. EVID. CODE § 956 (West 1991).
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formal written opinions. It may or may not include elements of busi-
ness or non-legal [i.e., financial] advice ....""'
A recent example of this dilemma comes from the case of FDIC
v. Wise.2" 4 The FDIC's complaint alleges that Silverado Banking,
Savings and Loan Association (hereinafter Silverado) suffered dam-
ages in excess of $200 million as a result of former officers' and
directors', as well as outside counsels', misconduct.215 The complaint
alleges, inter alia, that Michael Wise, counsel to Silverado, aided and
abetted the officers and directors of Silverado in breaching their fidu-
ciary duties.216 In addition, the FDIC claims that "[clounsel did not
adequately advise on, inquire into, or investigate relevant [financial]
matters on behalf of Silverado.
' '1
1 7
While the Wise court did not provide a definitive opinion re-
garding whether attorneys must give their client depositories finan-
cial advice, the decision implies that attorneys may do so.21 8 The
court stated that the defendant law firm "[mlay have had a duty to
advise Silverado on different aspects of these [financial] affairs. '2 19
This position is supported by Model Rule 2.1, which reads, "[i]n
representing a client . . . a lawyer may refer not only to law but to
other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political fac-
tors, that may be relevant to the client's situation. '"20 To make their
representation competent, then, attorneys may be required to include
financial advice along with their legal advice.
Keith Fisher, head of the ABA Task Force, disagrees: "Case
law from several jurisdictions concludes that no such duty [providing
clients with business advice] exists."22' The reason for this statement
is that many attorneys may not be entirely qualified to give financial
advice. Giving such advice may be beyond their level of expertise.
222
If lawyers are not well versed in financial matters, their advice
would not be based on sound financial knowledge and principles.
213. Lehr, supra note 21, at 60 n.8.
214. FDIC v. Wise, 758 F. Supp. 1414 (D. Colo. 1991).
215. Id. at 1416.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1418.
218. This opinion considers only a limited set of issues; namely, specific motions to dis-
miss claims and motions for summary judgment. Ultimate findings of fact and opinions based
on the merits will not be given by the court until this case reaches trial. Id.
219. FDIC v. Wise, 758 F. Supp. 1414, 1419 (D. Colo. 1991).
220. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.1 (Discussion Draft 1990)
(emphasis added).
221. Fisher, supra note 3, at 11.
222. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 cmt. 1 (Discussion Draft
1990).
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There is, then, the potential for risk of loss to depositors if banks
follow the business advice of attorneys. Therefore, it appears to be
unsafe and unsound according to FIRREA for lawyers to give such
uninformed advice to their client banks.
Model Rule 1.1 suggests that if attorneys do not possess the
requisite knowledge and expertise required to render their clients
competent legal advice, lawyers should do what they can to make
sure that the advice is competent.22 Such measures include consult-
ing with other lawyers "of established competence in the field in
question, '  i.e., those who have experience in financial transac-
tions, attorneys who have joint J.D./M.B.A. degrees, or lawyers
who have educated themselves about the field. The ultimate solution
to this problem would be for lawyers who serve as counsel to insured
depositories to obtain training in the legal and financial fields, so
that they could use their knowledge of both areas to provide their
clients with truly informed advice.
Therefore, it seems clear that attorneys who possess the requi-
site training in financial matters may provide their clients with busi-
ness advice and still satisfy the "safe and sound" requirement of
FIRREA. On the other hand, if lawyers offer such counsel without
the benefit of thoroughly educating themselves regarding financial
matters, that act is considered an unsafe and unsound practice ac-
cording to FIRREA, and they expose themselves to personal liability
as a result.
Weinstein's model, working in combination with FIRREA, has
a definite effect on an attorney's ability and desire to provide busi-
ness advice to clients. Because attorneys owe their primary duty to
the federal government as insurer, lawyers would. refrain from giving
business advice to their financial institution clients if there is even
the slightest doubt in their minds that the advice is not one hundred
percent correct. Assuming that attorneys can and will insulate them-
selves from liability by refusing to give financial advice, and that
Weinstein's suggestion that lawyers must reach financial conclusions
as an integral part of their representation of thrifts is erroneous,
banks will discontinue employment of attorneys for the purpose of
obtaining financial advice, because much less advice would be forth-
coming than in the past. As a result, attorneys stand to lose a sub-
stantial amount of income that existed pre-FIRREA and pre-Wein-
stein's model. In addition, financially knowledgeable lawyers will not
223. Id.
224. Id.
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be able to make cutting-edge financial suggestions to their clients
that potentially could earn the bank and its depositors a great deal of
money. Weinstein's proposal would stifle innovation and advances in
the world of banking while at the same time create personal liability
problems for attorneys.
V. PROPOSAL
A. Ways in Which Attorneys Can Insulate Themselves from
Personal Liability if Weinstein's Model is Adopted
There are several means by which attorneys and their law firms
can insulate themselves from liability under FIRREA if Weinstein's
model is applied by the courts. The following suggestions are made
in the contexts of the three fact scenarios, i.e., when the actions of
the financial institution and its counsel are clearly legal, clearly ille-
gal, and neither clearly legal nor clearly illegal. Several commenta-
tors have made recommendations along these lines. This comment
expands on these suggestions and adds more to the list, as well as
proposes alterations to Weinstein's model to make it more practical
and considerate of the needs of attorneys, depositors, and federal
regulators.
1. Clearly Legal Conduct by Well-Run Financial Institutions
The most obvious means by which attorneys can insulate them-
selves from personal liability is to stop representing insured deposito-
ries altogether.22 5 While this method is a sure-fire way to eliminate
exposure to liability, it is not economically desirable for law firms.
Serving as counsel to financial institutions can be extremely lucrative
for attorneys, so this option should be used as a last resort. Alterna-
tively, the idea could be narrowed a bit. Law firms could represent
only those insured depositories that "have no prior history of miscon-
duct."22 As a result of the recent increase in bank failure due to
fraud, however, there might not be many "clean" financial institu-
tions left to represent. One commentator also called this option "a
'cop-out' with respect to professional responsibility. 22 7 What attor-
neys really need is a way to restructure their counsel, not eliminate it
altogether.
225. Lehr, supra note 21, at 62.
226. Id.
227. Id.
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One means of restructuring is for attorneys to "retain personal
records, including not only opinions actually given, but [also] opin-
ions they declined to give." '228 Such action would allow attorneys to
represent banks while remaining confident that they could rebut alle-
gations by the FDIC that they provided their clients with unsafe and
unsound legal advice. Another way attorneys could use written docu-
ments to protect themselves is to "limit in writing the scope of [their]
representation by the use of rather specific engagement letters." '229
For example, they could stipulate that they will not provide their
clients with any financial advice. Attorneys could also use disclaimers
in their representation contracts, stating that they do not warrant as
one hundred percent reliable any financial or business advice given
to the client, since the law, and not economics, is their field of
expertise.
2. Clearly Illegal Activities by Financial Institutions
What Lawyers Should Do When They Discover the Illegal Practices
When attorneys find out that their thrift clients are engaging in
clearly illegal activities, they are put in an awkward position. These
lawyers must either maintain the attorney-client relationship and al-
low the financial institution to break the law and potentially become
insolvent in the process, or these lawyers must breach the duty of
confidentiality owed to their clients in order to save the bank from
failure and the taxpayers from footing the bill for the bail-out.
Retaining documentation of the advice given and not given, as
mentioned above, will insulate attorneys from personal liability only
to a limited extent. While the records will show that lawyers did not
advise their clients to commit illegal acts, attorneys would still be
liable under Weinstein's model if they do not act affirmatively to
prevent the illegal acts by informing the federal regulators. This
problem suggests that neither informing the board of directors nor
resigning according to Model Rule 1.13, without making a disclosure
to the federal regulators, would be sufficient to protect attorneys
from personal liability. Trying first to work out the problem with
the bank by advising its directors to discontinue the illegal activity
would be equally ineffective if the illegal acts continued.
These two options are insufficient to insulate lawyers from per-
sonal liability for several reasons. Even if lawyers instruct the of-
ficers and directors to conform their transactions to the law, this ad-
228. FDIC Will Target Attorney Malpractice, supra note 124, at 547.
229. Lehr, supra note 21, at 62.
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vice might not be followed. Along the same lines, if the attorney
informs the board that the bank is engaging in illegal banking prac-
tices, the board might ignore the warning and allow the acts to con-
tinue. If either of these two scenarios occur, lawyers cannot protect
themselves at this stage by mere withdrawal. Usually, they learn the
details of the illegal practices gradually and first try to rectify the
problems by directly dealing with the client, as discussed above.230
By the time the lawyers find out that the illegalities are continuing,
they are already "tainted" by the improper activity.23' Even if the
lawyer withdraws as soon as the illegalities are discovered, he or she
would still have knowledge that, if brought to the attention of the
federal regulators, possibly could help prevent the bank from failing
financially.
The thrust of Weinstein's argument in this context is that attor-
neys must do whatever they can to protect the financial institution,
and by extension, the federal government as insurer. 2  In this case,
it is in the best interests of the depositors to inform the federal regu-
lators of the improprieties. Therefore, no matter what lawyers do
under these circumstances, anything short of informing the govern-
ment will result in personal liability under Weinstein's proposal.
The best way attorneys can protect themselves from the federal gov-
ernment, then, is to disclose the confidential information to the fed-
eral regulators if their efforts to work out the problems with the
client have failed. This option may expose lawyers to legal malprac-
tice suits by their clients for breach of the attorney-client privilege." 3
If the attorney is sued, all he or she can do is hope that the jury,
which is comprised of taxpayers, is sympathetic to the reasons the
lawyer gives for violating the privilege. In California, however, if the
attorney's representation is sought by the bank to procure a crime or
fraud, attorneys do not put themselves at risk of a malpractice action
by their clients. Attorneys are entitled to disclose such information
under these circumstances in California.
2 34
230. Rutter, supra note 2, at 35.
231. Id.
232. Weinstein, supra note 18, at 4.
233. Attorneys could try to stem the threat of such litigation by requiring their clients to
sign a written statement at the beginning of their representation that they will disclose such
information to the federal regulators. Such a written waiver may help solve the malpractice
liability problem. However, it would only contribute to the problems of lost attorney income
from a reduction in representation of banks and further inhibit client candor, as discussed
above. See supra part IV.3.b. and text accompanying notes 160-64 & 225-29.
234. CAL. EVID. CODE § 956 (West 1991).
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3. Questionable or Potentially Risky Financial Practices -
The Balancing Act Between the Client, the Depositors, and the
Federal Regulators
One way in which attorneys can protect themselves from liabil-
ity when it is not clear whether the bank's transactions are clearly
legal or illegal is to disclaim responsibility for financial decisions
and/or not provide them at all, as discussed above. There are addi-
tional ways for attorneys to protect themselves under these circum-
stances, but they could prove costly. One possibility is to have "a
review partner [oversee] virtually every piece of advice or interaction
with a client." '285 The problem with this option is that the review
partner would end up duplicating much of the associate's work. It
would be inadequate for the review partner just to review summaries
prepared by the associate, because the associate unwittingly could
omit information necessary to the decision.2"6 To adequately insulate
the firm from liability and ensure that the proper decisions are
made, the review partner would have to conduct his or her own com-
plete review of the facts and circumstances surrounding the transac-
tion. This option is obviously very expensive for the client banks,
because partners' hourly rates are higher than associates'.
Another possibility is to "increase the competence of those who
are handling the representation of regulated institutions."" 7 Such
upgrades in expertise could be accomplished by sending attorneys to
business school. As one commentator stated, "There is a need to un-
derstand the business purpose and economic substance of a transac-
tion and the total regulatory context that typically requires the atten-
tion of a more experienced attorney."" 8 A more practical and cost-
effective alternative to training attorneys who are already employed
with the firm is to hire those who already have earned both J.D. and
M.B.A. degrees. Hiring these lawyers for the specific purpose of
counselling client banks would eliminate the increased cost to the
firm, which would prevent the need for firms to raise their rates. If
this practice were adopted, attorneys' and the public's interests
would be sufficiently served. Lawyers would not have to worry about
losing their financial institution clients, because they would not be
lacking the ability to serve all of their clients' needs regarding legal
and business advice. Attorneys would also be more comfortable offer-
235. Lehr, supra note 21, at 62.
236. Id. at 62-63.
237. Id. at 63.
238. Id.
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ing such advice, because their business training would presumably
provide them with a better understanding of what constitutes unsafe
and unsound banking practices. The taxpayers' interests would also
be protected, because these specialized attorneys would be less likely
to advise their clients to enter into unsafe and unsound banking
practices. Therefore, fewer financial depositories would fail, and the
taxpayers would not be forced to pay the higher taxes needed to bail
out the federal insurers.
Informing the board of directors under these circumstances ac-
cording to Model Rule 1.13, as opposed to the clearly illegal scena-
rio, should be enough for attorneys to protect themselves. Because it
is unclear whether the proposed transactions are unsafe and un-
sound, the standard for attorney liability should be more lenient.
There is no need to "cry wolf" and inform the regulators, since the
board may be able to resolve the problem on its own. If the attorney
feels strongly that the transaction is unsafe and unsound and informs
the board of this opinion, but the board does nothing to make the
transaction legal, the attorney's best course of action is to withdraw
according to Model Rule 1.13. The act of withdrawal might serve as
a signal to the federal regulators that there is a potential problem,
prompting the regulators to conduct a routine investigation of the
thrift. If this system works, it would enable the regulators to prevent
thrift failure and taxpayer exposure to the resulting bail-out, thus
preserving Congress' public image. In addition, lawyers would be
able to escape personal liability resulting from the federal regulators'
findings, while at the same time protecting themselves from legal
malpractice suits by their former clients for breach of the attorney-
client privilege. If Weinstein's model were improved, however, this
kind of "phantom disclosure" by lawyers would not be required to
preserve the interests of all parties involved.
B. Improvements on Weinstein's Model
With a few alterations in form and application, Weinstein's
model could serve a useful purpose in certain specific contexts. First,
one way to make Weinstein's suggestion practical is to require attor-
neys to "make disclosures to the full board of directors when disclo-
sure to the board is necessary [i.e., when the transaction is poten-
tially unsafe and unsound]." '239 This suggestion essentially restates
Model Rule 1.13. By going to the board first, the attorney may be
239. FDIC Will Target Attorney Malpractice, supra note 124, at 547.
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able to prevent the bank from engaging in the unsafe and unsound
practice altogether, thus eliminating the need to involve the federal
regulators. Also, members of the board could provide some insight
and suggest ways to make the proposed transaction safe and sound.
In addition, the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship is
preserved, because the institution, which is represented by the board
of directors, is the client. The institution and its officers and directors
still would feel comfortable discussing any and all potentially illegal
activities with their attorneys, because they would not have to worry
that the attorney would inform the federal regulators.
Second, Weinstein's model could be applied only to cases where
clients approach attorneys for assistance in helping them carry out
clearly illegal, i.e., fraudulent, transactions. In other words, a version
of California Evidence Code section 952 and Model Rule 1.6 should
be adopted. "According to Stanford Law School Professor Deborah
L. Rhode, who specializes in ethical issues, many jurisdictions are
moving away from strict confidentiality, especially in instances where
the lawyer has information suggesting fraud."24 As long as the of-
ficers and directors of the bank ask attorneys to help them perpetuate
a crime or fraud, the attorneys should be required to inform the fed-
eral regulators of this plan. The physical harm qualification of
Model Rule 1.6, which is not included in CEC section 952, can be
modified for purposes of this proposal to require instead the likeli-
hood of "imminent financial harm" to the taxpayers through unsafe
and unsound banking practices.
This model prevents outright fraud by insured financial institu-
tions, while drawing support from the arguments on which Wein-
stein's original proposal relied. In this updated version of Wein-
stein's model, attorneys are still in the best position to obtain
confidential information regarding the potential for failure of banks,
so they are best able to prevent said failure. The taxpayers and the
federal government as insurer are protected, but the attorney-client
relationship is not compromised, because lawyers have always been
under an affirmative duty to prevent crime or fraud. Moreover,
banking innovation is not stifled, because if the proposed acts are not
clearly illegal, there is no duty on attorneys to inform the federal
regulators. Client banks are still able to feel comfortable about dis-
cussing proposed transactions that could, in good faith, test the
boundaries of the law, without worrying that their attorneys will
breach their confidence and disclose the confidential communications
240. Rutter, supra note 2, at 83.
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to federal regulators. Most importantly for attorneys, this model al-
lows lawyers to protect themselves from allegations by the FDIC
that they were involved in the illegal acts of the bank.
VI. CONCLUSION
The passage of FIRREA and the inclusion of attorneys as po-
tential targets for liability surely cause lawyers justifiable concern.
Of even greater worry is the use of that liability in conjunction with
Harris Weinstein's theory that attorneys for insured financial insti-
tutions owe their highest fiduciary duty to the federal government as
insurer. If that duty is breached and FIRREA is violated concur-
rently, lawyers stand to lose a great deal in terms of potential clients,
as well as their freedom to practice law, their ability to earn money,
and their freedom as individuals. The problem with FIRREA and
with Weinstein's theory is that they are vague, which makes it diffi-
cult for attorneys to conform their conduct to these standards."
The combined use of FIRREA and Weinstein's model will pro-
duce an extreme chilling effect on the legal representation of insured
financial institutions. Client banks will be afraid to disclose informa-
tion critical to proposed transactions, because they do not want their
attorneys to report them to the federal regulators. In addition, the
acts might not even be unsafe and unsound. The uncertainty in the
definition of "unsafe and unsound" will cause attorneys and banks to
become overly cautious. If it is not clear whether the proposed trans-
action is unsafe and unsound, financial institutions will refrain from
proceeding so as to avoid potential liability. This overly cautious ap-
proach, in turn, will discourage innovation in finance and could
cause banks to lose, rather than save, money.
As they stand now, the term "unsafe and unsound," as well as
Weinstein's theory, are unworkable and unfair. Banking regulators
have the benefit of hindsight when making their evaluations of
whether the acts were unsafe and unsound, and hence, whether or
not attorneys breached their supposed fiduciary duty to the federal
government. 42 This Monday morning quarterbacking is inherently
unjust, because the banks and lawyers can never be one hundred
percent positive in advance that their transactions will turn out to be
241. Weinstein's model is not yet law, but it is assumed for the sake of this comment
that it will become law after the recent attorney malpractice cases brought by the FDIC are
decided. Because the FDIC and the courts in which these cases are being tried are both federal
creatures, it is expected that the federal courts will provide a great deal of deference to the
FDIC's position.
242. Baxter, supra note 6, at S253.
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safe and sound.243
Instead of rebuilding confidence in the banking industry, FIR-
REA and Weinstein's model destroy public confidence in attorneys.
The suggestions in this comment regarding how attorneys to finan-
cial institutions can restructure their representation hopefully will
help them avoid future personal liability, as well as restore public
confidence in the morality and ability of attorneys.
Joseph E. Addiego III
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